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Cosmopolitanism has long preoccupied normative and empirical scholarship alike.​[1]​ Its origins as a methodological concept are much more recent: Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, above all, have criticized social scientists for assuming implicitly that nation-states normally enclose unified societies. Such “methodological nationalism” tends to reify the very categories it studies: the state, the nation, society. 
     According to Beck and Sznaider, this approach overlooks recent trends of cosmopolitanization, whereby social actors forge links across national borders and thus erode the state-based international order.​[2]​ They suggest that research must take these trends into account: “Cosmopolitanization should be chiefly conceived of as globalization from within, as internalized cosmopolitanism. This is how we can suspend the assumption of the nation-state, and this is how we can make the empirical investigation of local–global phenomena possible.”​[3]​ In other words, rather than treating states as the primary unit of analysis, researchers should look for emerging differences within these states and linkages between them, something that Beck and Sznaider call “methodological cosmopolitanism.” 
     This strategy is applied here to the study of German public opinion in order to determine the implications and limits of methodological cosmopolitanism in public opinion research. In particular, this paper considers Germans’ attitudes towards other nations and critically examines the claim that growing contact among the citizens of different states can bring about trust between them. 
     In what follows, the key terms globalization, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanization are defined. The third section introduces the data set and describes how the theoretical propositions can be tested. The fourth section presents the findings, showing that German attitudes towards foreigners are shaped by geographical proximity as much as by Germany’s long-established relationships with its allies. 

Globalization, Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanization 

Beck and Sznaider’s argument is based on certain observations about three interrelated processes that are challenging the prevalence of the state in international politics. Globalization, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanization are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably in the empirical literature to denote any process of rising above the nation-state.​[4]​ Nevertheless, in order to derive testable hypotheses, it is necessary to disentangle these different concepts and to define the interrelationships between them.
     To begin with, globalization is defined here as a multidimensional process whereby states, enterprises, and societies across the globe are becoming increasingly interconnected.​[5]​ This definition makes no predictions about where globalization is taking us. Likewise, it does not imply that globalization affects all people and communities equally. Rather, this is seen as a highly asymmetrical process of “global stratification in which some states, societies and communities are becoming increasingly enmeshed in the global order while others are becoming increasingly marginalized.”​[6]​ For example, economic integration is particularly intense among industrialized oecd countries or among the East Asian tiger economies, while African or Middle Eastern countries are marginal.​[7]​
     Socially, globalization has produced greater interdependence between different parts of the world.​[8]​ In many important ways, including education, work, and leisure, people’s behavior is no longer tied to the nation-state. The modern communications infrastructure, widespread language competence as well as increased mobility and tourist traffic have resulted in a multitude of private and societal linkages across national borders.​[9]​ Thus, it has been argued, are global interlinkages “reordering the very notion of distance itself,” allowing people from different parts of the world to become acquainted.​[10]​ Again, though, these processes are prevalent in certain parts of the world, while large swaths of the world population are barely affected by globalization.​[11]​
     This brings us to the second term—transnationalism—that is related to globalization but not synonymous with it. Processes of globalization indirectly affect the composition and cohesion of national communities, something that Beck and Sznaider have referred to as the “Transnationality arising inside the nation state.”​[12]​ The term “makes the point that many of the linkages in question are not ‘international,’ in the strict sense of involving nations—actually, states—as corporate actors. In the transnational arena, the actors may now be individuals, groups, movements, or business enterprises.’​[13]​
     While research on globalization suggests that geographical distance is less and less of a constraint on international integration, the main research strands on the subject of transnationalism draw attention to two forms of encounter with a strong spatial dimension. The first refers to changes that take place at the heart of national societies following the arrival of immigrants and the way that these interact with the native population.​[14]​ Large cities in particular are often home to several migrant communities from different backgrounds.​[15]​ Interactions between these communities and the native population take many shapes including assimilation, coexistence, or blending together over generations. The second perspective on transnationalism refers to processes of integration in geographically contiguous areas across national borders.​[16]​ Provided that borders are open to citizen traffic, border regions can be seen as sites of particularly high interaction density. Short distances facilitate personal contact, and there are often material incentives for cross-border interaction such as price differentials or career opportunities. Both facets of transnationalism result in reduced congruence between borders and national communities. 
     If globalization brings about interdependencies between states and transnationalism fosters contacts between members of different nations, then Beck and Sznaider’s concept of cosmopolitanization, or “globalization from within,” highlights the question of what effect these two processes have on the citizens’ awareness of national community. Traditionally, large political communities are held together by networks of interaction and a sense of trust among the citizens. This view has been promoted by Karl Deutsch among others.​[17]​ It is also a prominent theme in the social capital literature, where within-group or “bonding” social capital is seen to strengthen people’s sense of national cohesion.​[18]​ Social capital represents networks of interactions on the one hand and trust, that is confidence in other people’s dependability, on the other.​[19]​ 
     At the same time, interaction across national boundaries fosters a sense of “bridging social capital.” This term denotes networks with and trust in members of other communities.​[20]​ For Deutsch and his collaborators, the same communicative processes that constitute a nation trigger the integration of different nations across borders.​[21]​ This is because intercultural exchanges allow people to gather first-hand information about their neighbors. Information, in turn, counters suspicions and prejudice, fostering greater interaction and cooperation. ​[22]​ With deepening integration, Deutsch expected that trust would develop, then a shared sense of community, and finally identification in the form of a common identity. ​[23]​ 
     In other words, contact and trust are not just two related components of social capital. One actually causes the other. Indeed, social psychologists have long argued that greater understanding between members of different nations emerges as a result of interaction between them.​[24]​ Thus, pleasant encounters with members of previously mistrusted groups tend to improve opinions of them. Moreover, people often generalize from such encounters.​[25]​ Thus, pleasant encounters with a Cambodian will usually predispose people favorably towards all Cambodians. 
     Not all people are equally open to such contact and not all types of contact are equally conducive to the development of trust. For example, it has been shown that contact, to have an effect, must be recurrent and pleasant.​[26]​ But on the whole, the increased transnational interactions that result from globalization can be expected to result in greater trust in other nations.​[27]​ 




In employing methodological cosmopolitanism, research into public attitudes towards other nations faces a difficult task. Such research is based on certain assumptions about the structure of these attitudes. In particular, it is taken for granted that people categorize others according to citizenship or nationality. To elicit information from respondents, survey questions must therefore draw on the same reference categories. In other words, it would be impossible to investigate Germans’ trust in other nations without asking them questions such as “how much do you trust Cambodians?” With its aim of analyzing attitudes towards other nations, therefore, this article is guilty of methodological nationalism. Even so, it illuminates two important aspects of the transnationality arising in Germany: first, it breaks up the notion of German public opinion by examining the spatial dimension of Germans’ transnational contact. Second, it analyses the effect of contact on Germans’ trust in six other nations. 
     To be precise, the analysis includes a geographical dimension in order to examine whether opportunity for contact actually goes hand in hand with greater contact. As shown in the previous section, two forms of transnationality have a bearing. First, short distances in border regions facilitate contact with people who live in the neighboring countries.​[29]​ In other words, one would expect contact with French and Polish citizens to be particularly high in Germany’s border regions with France and Poland. The second dimension concerns immigrants in Germany. While immigrant communities are often concentrated in large cities, the main contrast in Germany is between the small number of immigrants in East Germany and varying levels of immigration in different parts of West Germany. Once the extent to which contact varies has been established, one can determine whether trust in other nations varies as a result. Does Germans’ contact with members of other nations bring about greater trust in these nations? If so, does the type of contact make any difference?
     This paper conducts secondary analysis of survey data on Germans’ transnational relationships that was collected on behalf of the University Bremen in spring 2006. 2,700 German nationals aged sixteen or over were interviewed about their contacts with non-Germans, travels to other countries, attitudes towards foreigners and globalization. The study showed that Germans have a lot of contact with other nations, particularly with western ones that Germany has long had close political and social ties with, including the u.s., France, or Spain.​[30]​ 
     The paper focuses on Germans’ relationship with six other nations: Americans, French, Italians, Poles, Russians, and Turks. Poland and France share a border with Germany, and it is hypothesized that contact is particularly dense in these border regions. Turks, Italians and Poles constitute the three largest immigrant groups in Germany, though there is also a sizeable Russian community. Due to the long distance between the u.s. and Germany and due to the comparatively small number of Americans residing in Germany, Germans’ transnational connections with the u.s. are weakest. Nevertheless, the two countries share long-standing political, economic, and social relations. In the present context, these are outshone only by the strong Franco-German alliance.




The proportion of foreign residents in different districts is included here as a measure of opportunity for “multicultural” contact within Germany.​[31]​ It is not possible to determine the actual composition of the foreign population at district level. To be sure, contacts are not equally likely with all other nations in all districts—it is well-known that cities such as Frankfurt/Main and Stuttgart are home to a particularly large number of people from former Yugoslavia, while Munich or Mannheim have a very high proportion of Turks.​[32]​ Nevertheless, since the main migrant communities are fairly well-represented across the country, the proportion of foreign residents is an adequate measure of opportunity for contact.
     The indicator for contact in border regions, and more generally beyond Germany’s borders, is based on the following question: “Please think of people who are not German citizens, to whom you are not related and who live abroad. With how many such people do you have regular private contact?” Respondents were asked about these people’s nationality for a maximum of four foreign contacts abroad. A dichotomous variable indicates whether respondents had contact with at least one member from the nation in question. For contact with foreigners within Germany, the question reads: “Please think of people who are not German citizens, to whom you are not related and who live here in Germany. With how many such people do you have regular private contact?” Again, a dichotomous variable shows whether respondents had contact with at least one member from the nation in question. 
     The fact that these questions gauge regular contact precludes any superficial encounters such as short-lived tourist experiences. In both cases, it is also possible to determine the type of contact. For each person with whom respondents have regular private contact, either across borders or within Germany, they were asked what forms communication takes. Due to the special relevance of geographical proximity for personal contact, the present analysis initially distinguishes between contact in general and personal contact in particular. 
     In the second part of the analysis, respondents’ answers to a question that gauges trust in people from other countries are used as the dependent variable: “Would you say that one can trust most [Americans, French, Italians, Poles, Russians, Turks] or had one better be careful with [them]?” This was dummy-coded such that all respondents who answered “One can trust most [members of the nation in question]” can be compared to all those who answered “One had better be careful with [them].” 








The figure shows that location and contact go hand in hand in both cases. The odds that a German has contact with Poles are more than four times higher if that German lives in the border region with Poland.​[34]​ For French citizens, they are more than twice as high in the border region. Figure 2 also shows that age, unemployment, and sex do not have an impact on cross-border contact, while more highly educated Germans are slightly more likely to have contact with French citizens. 




This figure also shows that education, sex, and unemployment have an inconsistent effect on contact. As expected, the older a respondent is, the smaller the odds that he or she will have contact with Poles, Russians, Turks, and Italians, though age does not influence contact with French and Americans.
     Theories of globalization hold that geographical distance has lost much of its significance as a result of the modern communications infrastructure and greater popular mobility. Figures 2 and 3 have demonstrated the continued relevance of geographical proximity for contact in general, but physical distances remain particularly important for personal contact. While telephone or email contact can be maintained anywhere, personal contact with members of other nations should be particularly common in close proximity with those nations. In order to examine this proposition, Figures 4 and 5 display the same results as Figures 2 and 3, with personal visits replacing general contact as the dependent variable.





     Figure 4 shows that residence in the borderlands increases the likelihood of personal contact with French and Poles. The odds that a respondent has regular personal exchanges with a Pole are more than eleven times higher in the border region than elsewhere in Germany. In the border region with France, too, personal contact is more likely than general contact. Conversely, Figure 5 shows that the statistics for visits are similar to those for general contact in districts with a high proportion of foreign residents. The odds that somebody has personal exchanges with French, Poles, Turks, and Italians are higher in areas with a high proportion of foreign residents than elsewhere, but again no such relationship exists for visits with Russians and Americans.​[35]​ 




The first striking finding is that Germans’ trust in other Germans does not amount to the highest score. Rather, French and Italians are the most trusted, with nearly two-thirds and 57 percent of respondents respectively expressing trust in these two nations. Germans are only the third most trusted nation, with just under 55 percent of respondents expressing trust. To relate this back to the theoretical considerations, it looks as though bridging social capital with France and Italy is higher than bonding social capital within Germany. Explaining this phenomenon is difficult, but it demonstrates impressively the importance of Beck and Sznaider’s caution against taking the prevalence of the nation-state for granted. Americans are the third-most trusted nation, with nearly 50 percent of respondents expressing trust in them. Trust in eastern nations, notably Poles and Russians, but also Turks, is much lower. Less than a third of respondents express trust in people from Poland and Russia. 




The figure shows that cross-border contact is a significant factor in explaining Germans’ trust in Americans, French, and Italians as the three most trusted foreign nations. The odds that Germans who have contact with Italians and French will express trust in them are more than five times higher compared to Germans who have no contact. Similarly, the odds are about 1.3 times higher for Americans. Contact, however, does not have any influence on trust in Turks, Poles, and Russians. In other words, cross-border contact seems to generate trust in western nations but not in eastern ones. 
     As for factors related to individual respondents, education and sex appear to be particularly important. A one-degree increase in education increases the odds of expressing trust in the neighboring nation by nearly 19 percent (for Italians) up to nearly 43 percent (for Poles). Men are consistently more likely to express trust in other nations than women. Age has a significant positive effect on trust in French and Americans: older Germans are more likely to express trust in other nations than younger Germans. This is unexpected but might be explained as an effect of socialization: western Germany has a much longer history of close partnership with the u.s. and France than with Poland or Russia, and it is likely that this had an effect on older Germans’ trust in Americans and French. The odds of expressing trust in French and Turks are lower for unemployed Germans but otherwise unemployment has no effect.




The results stand in stark contrast with those presented in Figure 7. It looks as though multicultural contact has a positive effect on trust in all nations except Italians. The effect is particularly strong for Americans. The odds of expressing trust in this nation are more than three times higher if a respondent has had contact. Contact also increases the odds of expressing trust in French, Poles, Russians, and Turks. Highly educated and male Germans are consistently more likely to express trust. Conversely, age and being unemployed only have an inconsistent impact. 
     To summarize, there is some evidence that geographical proximity is an important factor in explaining Germans’ contact with members of other nations. Contact is particularly high in the border regions with France and Poland. Moreover, districts with a high proportion of foreign residents bring greater contact with most, though not all, nations under discussion. This is true of any type of contact and not just personal exchanges. 
     The analysis has also revealed a manifest West-East gap. In absolute terms, for example, there is less contact with eastern than with western nations. Moreover, Poles, Russians, and Turks are trusted less than Americans, Italians, and French. The same discrepancy between western and eastern nations can also be discerned if one analyzes the influence of cross-border contact on trust. Such contact does not increase Germans’ trust in Poles, Turks, and Russians. This would seem to suggest that Germans do not perceive western and eastern nations in the same way. They are not only less open to contact with these nations but also less prone to be influenced by it. While any attempts at explanation are necessarily speculative, it seems plausible that Germans hold a deep-seated sense of cultural connection with western nations, mirroring (West) Germany’s longer-lasting partnership with its western allies. Conversely, Germany’s good relations with Poland and Russia only developed in the 1990s. If this is true, it would be worthwhile to monitor Germans’ trust in the eastern nations in the future, as it is possible that trust will increase over time. 




This paper set out to uncover the “transnationality” arising in German public opinion. The results show that, far from there being such a thing as German public opinion, there is enormous variation both in terms of Germans’ behavior and in terms of their attitudes. That attitudes vary should surprise nobody. Nevertheless, Germans’ behavior, which in turn influences attitudes, differs according to geographical dimensions. This fact underscores the importance of Beck and Sznaider’s observations on the weakness of “methodological nationalism.” 
     This paper asked how different forms of transnational contact influence attitudes and to what extent contact with different nations brings about trust in those specific nations rather than foreigners in general. It showed that contact with members of other nations is more prevalent in border regions and in districts with a high proportion of foreigners. Such contact tends to result in a greater sense of trust in the nations in question, though two unexpected patterns emerge. First, there is a discrepancy between the three western nations and the three eastern ones under discussion. Trust is generally lower in the eastern nations than in the western ones. As far as contact with foreigners who live in their respective countries is concerned, such contact produces greater trust in western nations, but not in eastern ones. In this sense at least, there is a noticeable gap in Germans’ trust relationships. The second pattern to emerge is that multicultural contact with foreigners who live in Germany leads to greater trust in them in almost all cases. In particular, the west-east gap is not replicated under this type of contact. 
     There are several possible explanations for the selectivity of Germans’ trust and for the divergent impact of different forms of contact. To come back to the theoretical considerations outlined in the beginning, asymmetries are a common theme that runs through processes of globalization, transnationalism, and Germans’ contact with other nations, insofar as connections are much stronger between certain parts of the world than others. In this light, it is not overly surprising that cosmopolitanization, or the trust that develops as a result of contact, should also follow such a pattern. 
     Persistent asymmetries suggest that there are deeply entrenched cultural relationships that cannot be explained at the individual level alone. Consistent discrepancies between western and eastern nations indicate that the history of bilateral relations between states might have a stronger influence on people’s perceptions than indicated by theories of individual opinion change. It is possible that socialization in a certain political and economic setting is a crucial factor. Simply growing up in a country that has close political and economic relationships with some countries but not others will probably shape people’s perceptions of other countries, even if bilateral alliances expand later on. 
     It is also likely that there are cultural differences that are difficult to pinpoint but that no doubt exist. Thus, in cultural terms, Germans have traditionally seen themselves as having more in common with western nations such as their European neighbors in France or Italy than with Slavic nations such as Russians, or Poles or with Turks from a more eastern-influenced culture. Regrettably, the data set used here does not contain any information on the actual content of the contact situation. But, the idea that eastern cultures are simply less familiar to Germans than western ones is supported by the fact that cross-border contact with the eastern nations does not bring about any trust, while multicultural contact does. This suggests that immigrants in Germany are more sensitive to Germans’ expectations. In the end, further research is needed first to verify these findings and then to explore different explanations. 
     The final point takes us back to the methodological questions raised at the outset. In studying attitudes towards other nations, it is often assumed that the national level is the natural unit of analysis. Indeed, it would be difficult to study these attitudes without some recourse to methodological nationalism, at the very least in question design. At the same time, this article has shown that other levels of analysis might better reflect emerging transnational relationships within states, “making the empirical investigation of local–global phenomena possible.”​[38]​

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2010 workshop of the Political Studies Association, German Politics Specialist Group in Durham. The author would like to thank all participants for their input. Special thanks are due to Claire Sutherland, David Held, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. 
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